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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most academic journals are destined to be read by a few specialists and 
then quickly archived to dusty bookshelves. This special issue has a very 
different aim. It is primarily intended to be a gentle introduction for business 
practitioners interested in corporate applications of prediction markets.1 While 
it is easy to find laudatory reports on these markets in the popular press, such 
stories are typically based on only one or two case studies. This special issue 
seeks to bridge this gap, by collecting the experiences of several pioneers in 
corporate prediction markets.  
The authors in this issue are especially well-suited guides. They all have 
intimate first hand knowledge of these markets, whether organizers at their 
companies or as academics who have studied the actual workings of these 
markets. The articles are based on their presentations at the “Conference on 
Corporate Applications of Prediction/Information Markets,” held at the 
Kansas City’s Kauffman Foundation on 1 November 2007.2
Though the papers here highlight the potential for prediction markets to 
assist in firm decision-making, this is not a Pollyannaish assessment. Rather 
the special issue seeks to provide a sober assessment of both the benefits and 
∗ Koch Professor of Economics, University of Kansas School of Business 
1Prediction markets utilize the knowledge of a pool of individuals to help forecast 
questions of importance to companies, such as whether a sales target will be reached 
or whether a project will be completed in a timely manner. A more recent 
development is the use of such markets to generate and evaluate new ideas, such as 
new products or cost saving procedures  
2The sponsors of the conference were the University of Kansas School of Business, 
the Center for Applied Economics, and the Kauffman Foundation. I served as the 
conference organizer. The archive for the conference, which includes the complete 
schedule as well as notes on each talk, is available at: 
http://people.ku.edu/~cigar/PMConf_2007/PredictionMarketsConference.html
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possible costs of these markets. Prediction markets are not a magic elixir and 
will have a limited impact when they are applied to the wrong sort of 
questions or embedded in a dysfunctional environment. At the same time, 
under the right conditions these markets can be an extremely valuable aid for 
company decision-makers. The papers here glean such general lessons from 
actual markets. 
In the next section I lay out why companies are a particularly interesting 
test-bed for prediction markets. While firms are well positioned to utilize the 
information which prediction markets generate, they also face special 
challenges such as opposition of employees which currently control 
information flow within the company. The third section provides an executive 
summary of each article, along with a recap of the accompanying commentary 
pieces. As my summary points out, the papers not only provide basic 
information but also raise a number of thought-provoking questions which are 
currently the subject of active research. The future development of corporate 
markets will require the teamwork of both practitioners and academics to 
solve these problems. Finally, the last section concludes  
 
 
 
2. WHY COMPANIES? 
 
The first known corporate applications of prediction markets occurred 
about a decade ago. Since then, over a hundred companies have run internal 
markets. These firms span the size spectrum, including some of the largest in 
the world to those with only a handful of employees, and they cover a broad 
range of sectors, including those whose products are abstract ideas to others 
which manufacture the most low-tech products. Why have such a broad range 
of firms become interested in prediction markets? The answer lies in a 
common problem facing firms. 
Prediction markets have been employed to help combat a leading factor in 
bad decision-making, the isolation of executives from the views and insights 
of the company’s workforce. Such seclusion is no accident but instead reflects 
one of the reasons companies exist in the first place, namely to avoid 
information overload for already busy executives. To reach this goal firms 
developed a hierarchy structure, and assigned to middle management the task 
of deciding how much and what information was transmitted from employees 
to higher-level decision-makers. But this system has its costs, as potentially 
useful information may be filtered out if it reflects poorly on those who 
control the information flow. At the same time, lower-level employees have 
little incentive to make reports which conflict with their managers, who may 
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later punish them for their candor. The net result is that executives may only 
receive one-sided information, and flawed and unproductive decisions can 
result. 
This is where prediction markets come in. Suppose the CEO must decide 
whether to continue funding a research project, but he is concerned that he has 
been receiving overly optimistic reports on its prospects from managers who 
will benefit from the project continuing. A market on the project’s prospects 
would allow front-line employees to convey more realistic information, and 
they could do so without fear of reprisal so long as trading is anonymous. 
Prediction markets are also likely to function better than other approaches 
currently in use. For example, group meetings are less likely to have frank 
discussions while suggestion boxes do not scale well (prediction markets tend 
to perform better when there are more participants). And while most workers 
dread the thought of meetings, markets are often considered a fun and 
typically do not require much incentives to generate active employee 
involvement. 
This motivation aside, there are also particular reasons to think that 
companies are well positioned to utilize the information generated from 
prediction markets: 
• company divisions often serve as standalone silos, and markets can be 
a means of integrating the pockets information contained in each 
• executives may be interested not just in market aggregates, such as 
prices, but also the trades of particular groups of employees. For 
example, one could examine whether members of certain divisions 
are less prone to making biased forecasts. 
• companies need real-time information about the many uncertain 
events surrounding their decision-makers 
• firms can internalize the informational benefits of the market. A 
company can profit from the information generated from prices, since 
the market can be kept private and outside of the purview of 
competitors. 
The last point is particularly important. Since the benefits of the markets 
largely accrue to the company, we should expect many prediction market 
innovations to first arise in a corporate setting. For example, companies have 
been the first to experiment with using these markets to generate and evaluate 
ideas. One of the surprising results of these markets is that the ideas come not 
just from research staff but also (to borrow a phrase from Jim Lavoie, a 
contributor to this volume) the “quiet geniuses” whose suggestions are 
typically ignored. 
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At the same time corporate applications of prediction markets provide 
several unique challenges: 
• they face special legal requirements such as avoiding insider trading 
laws 
• they must overcome investor reluctance to a project with upfront costs 
and possibly delayed  benefits 
• there are impacts on employees, both detrimental (markets may 
distract staff away from their main responsibilities) and beneficial 
(there is often a gain in morale, as workers feel empowered because 
their market-mediated suggestions are impacting corporate decisions) 
• employees may sabotage a project in order to profit from a market on 
its prospects. There is an unfortunate asymmetry here, since it is far 
easier for an employee to engineer an unfavorable outcome for the 
firm than it is to create a favorable one. 
• the markets may overwhelm executives with too much information 
• market organizers must allay concerns of middle management and 
others whose current role in the company is threatened by the market 
The last two points highlight the delicate balance needed with internal 
markets. While the markets can provide executives with timely and unfiltered 
information, too much of this will be difficult for already busy executives to 
process and effectively utilize. This suggests that the markets should focus on 
targeted topics of particular interest in the executive suite. Similarly if the 
markets are too much of threat to those who currently regulate information 
flows in the corporate hierarchy, then these managers will lobby hard to 
eliminate them or prevent them from gaining traction in the first place. 
Markets which focus on the creation of ideas, rather than forecasts, are likely 
to generate less of this kind of opposition, and thus may be easier to 
implement. 
Such general principles aside, it is important to stress that prediction 
markets may only be appropriate for certain kinds of questions. For example, 
prediction markets have had difficulty in forecasting outcomes in which the 
fundamental information is quarantined from market participants (for 
example, in forecasting the decision of a secretive government committee). 
As this discussion points out, prediction markets are likely to be a better 
fit for some companies (and for some questions) than others. To evaluate 
whether to use markets, it is important to weigh the costs and benefits listed 
above. The tradeoff may be favorable only in for certain kinds of firms, such 
as those where the corporate culture already embraces experiments. 
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3. PREVIEW OF PAPERS IN THIS ISSUE 
 
The papers in this special issue span a wide range of topics related to 
corporate markets. The subject matter includes tips on how to establish 
markets, on how to tweak a market to obtain certain goals, what pitfalls to 
avoid, as well as highlights of some of the exciting state-of-the art 
applications occurring in companies today. Accompanying each paper is a 
commentary which helps put the work in context. I briefly note some of the 
key highlights of each paper, but I highly recommend reading each in their 
entirety. 
Jim Lavoie, a co-founder of Rite-Solutions, writes about his personal 
experience with internal markets (this paper is based on the keynote address at 
the 2007 conference). Jim lays out the reasons why he has made such markets 
an integral part of his company, and he provides a host of practical tips on 
how to get markets up and running. Jim also touches on some of the successes 
he has had with these markets, such as boosting employee morale and 
improving innovation. He also describes the novel use of these markets to 
both elicit and evaluate new ideas, an application which is now known as an 
Idea Market (the next paper in this volume discusses Idea Markets at GE). 
This is a wonderful paper for those curious about whether an internal market 
would be a good match for their company, and given its cutting edge 
application to idea markets it a fount of ideas for researchers and experienced 
practitioner alike. Jim has also set up a website, http://artofinnovation.net/, 
which allows readers to sample some of his Rite-Solutions markets. 
Art Hall, who heads the Center for Applied Economics at University of 
Kansas, comments on Lavoie’s piece. Art points out some of the potential 
pitfalls in the application of markets within companies. He shows how Rite-
Solutions has been able to incorporate the markets into their corporate culture, 
which has allowed them to liberate pent-up creative instincts. At the same 
time, he notes the managerial challenges which must be met to get markets to 
operate successfully. 
The second paper in the volume is by Brian Spears, Christina LaComb, 
John Interrante, Janet Barnett, and Deniz Senturk-Dogonaksoy, and it 
discusses GE’s experience with Idea Markets in its Energy division (these 
authors organized and operated GE’s markets). The authors show how GE has 
used these markets to generate and rank new ideas. A wealth of information is 
provided on topics ranging from participation rates to trader satisfaction with 
the markets to a quantitative appraisal of how well the markets elicit and rate 
ideas. There is also a very detailed description of the mechanics of the 
markets, such as the incentives given to traders and to creators of new ideas, 
which will be of particular interest to those looking for tips on how to 
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structure a market at their own company. The authors also chart out some 
important avenues for future work, such as how to deal with the unusual 
trading behavior of idea creators. The numerical analysis in this paper serves 
as nice complement to the qualitative discussion in the earlier Rite-Solutions 
paper. Given that Idea Markets are one of the most exciting applications of 
corporate markets and GE and Rite-Solutions are the unquestioned leaders in 
this area, these papers are essential reads. 
Marco Ottaviani offers commentary on the GE paper. Marco notes that the 
creation and evaluation of ideas are fundamentally thorny issues both within 
companies and more generally. He also highlights two leading challenges to 
the use of Idea Markets. Since the market expires before any of the ideas in 
the market are implemented, it is difficult to validate which idea is in fact best 
(in contrast the truth is observed in standard prediction markets, e.g. we know 
whether printer sales exceeded their goals for this quarter). A second issue 
involves the potential manipulation of the prices by an idea creator, who can 
potentially benefit if the market identifies his idea as the best. Marco offers 
some tentative solutions to these issues, and notes that working on a fuller 
solution is an important topic for both academics and practitioners. 
The third paper in the volume is from Henry Berg and Todd Proebsting, 
who have jointly run a variety of prediction markets at Microsoft. Their paper 
focuses on some practical issues associated with the implementation of an 
automated market maker (AMM). An AMM is a mechanism which 
overcomes the illiquidity problem of many prediction markets: what happens 
if a market participant shows up and no one else stands ready to trade with 
him? The AMM stands ready to accept all trades on either side of a contract, 
and so allows the participant to immediately execute his trades. Such AMMs 
are now commonly employed in most corporate prediction markets as well as 
many public ones. Henry and Todd provide formulae which they have used in 
their implementation of an AMM at Microsoft. They also provide a range of 
practical tips for how these formulae can be tailored to other applications, as 
well as provide suggestions for other important aspects of market design 
which encourage both participation and appropriate trading behavior. 
Robin Hanson, whose research laid out the foundations for most 
implementations of AMM’s in prediction markets, is the commenter on the 
Microsoft paper. Robin provides an intuitive introduction to AMM’s, which 
will be of particular use to those who have not encountered them before. He 
also discusses various practical issues with the AMM, and how it is flexible 
enough to be adjusted to suit a market administrator’s particular goals. 
In the fourth paper Adam Siegel, a co-founder of Inkling Markets, writes 
about his experience as a vendor and organizer of prediction markets (Inkling 
has helped a blue-chip list of corporate clients, such as Johnson & Johnson, 
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Chevron, and CNN, set-up and run markets. Inkling also runs several public 
markets which may be found at http://home.inklingmarkets.com). This article 
serves as an excellent how-to guide for companies just starting to experiment 
with prediction markets. Adam first lays out the case for why companies 
should consider using markets as a means for improved decision-making on 
topics such as project planning and resource allocation. He also provides a list 
of practical tips for market administrators, such as the need to promote 
interest among potential traders/employees and to provide a constant stream 
of new markets. A set of challenges which the new market is likely to 
confront is also provided. Adam concludes with a practical check-list which 
will allow companies to decide whether prediction markets are a good fit for 
them. A real bonus for practitioners is the insights and lessons provided by 
two of Inkling’s clients, Cisco and a global consumer products company. 
Paul Rhode’s commentary on the Inkling paper points out the close 
connection of the benefits and challenges from corporate applications of 
prediction markets. One potential benefit from these markets is the facilitation 
of information flows within the company hierarchy, mitigating the censoring 
and potential bias from middle management. At the same time, Paul points out 
one of the reasons we have companies is to economize on transaction costs 
and information overload among executives. Middle management’s 
winnowing of information can be a crucial time-saver for busy executives. 
And from a less altruistic perspective, these middle managers will strongly 
oppose markets if they view them as a challenge to their information 
hegemony. Paul points out that a successful corporate market will only be 
possible if these and other issues are adequately addressed. 
Tom Bell authors the last paper in this issue. Tom’s paper is a bit different 
from the others in that he is writing not about the workings of a corporate 
market, but rather he is addressing the rather murky legal environment which 
surrounds them (Tom is one of the leading law scholars studying firm 
markets).  The legal issues are far more than an academic curiosity, as some 
firms have decided to steer clear of prediction markets to avoid exposure to 
litigation or government regulation. As Tom shows, understanding the legal 
status of a company’s market is quite complicated. While issues related to 
gambling laws can be mitigated through the use of play money, any market 
potentially violates securities laws through the creation of new classes of 
insiders. Solutions to the latter questions are more subtle, and some (such as 
the public disclosure of market outcomes) may reduce or even eliminate the 
benefit of the information which the market collects. Tom goes on to suggest 
better solutions to these and other problems. He also discusses the wide range 
of regulatory changes currently being considered, any of which will have 
important implications for the legality of corporate markets. Clearly the legal 
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issues surrounding corporate markets are in need of further study, and it will 
be leading scholars such as Tom who will help provide that scholarship. This 
article is a must read for anyone interested in using such markets. 
Robert Litan’s comment on this paper also notes the rather uncertain legal 
environment surrounding corporate markets. While many companies have 
braved these issues and started their own markets, the potential legal 
repercussions may have dissuaded others. Robert points out that regulators 
seem to have placed a premium on avoiding speculation rather than 
encouraging innovative new mechanisms such as prediction markets. He 
further notes that the overlapping jurisdiction of several regulators such as the 
SEC and CFTC itself creates legal anxiety and further discourages the spread 
of markets. Even if corporate markets do not receive a clear stamp of legality, 
Robert points out several ways in which current regulations could be 
improved. 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
My hope is that this volume will serve as a guide for future applications of 
prediction markets. At the same time, the papers here raise several thought 
provoking challenges which practitioners and scholars will grapple with for 
some time to come. It will be exciting to see the solutions and also to see 
whether prediction markets deliver on their potential in a corporate setting. 
Readers interested in even more details on the topics raised here should 
consult the archive of the original Kansas City conference which includes 
presentations from the authors here as well as from other companies involved 
with prediction markets (a link is provided Section 1). 
Finally, if you are interested in starting your own corporate market and 
have questions, please feel free to get in touch with me directly at 
cigar@ku.edu. If I am not able to directly answer your question, I will try and 
connect you with others in the field that can. 
 
 
 
 
 
